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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce PE-AONT: a novel algorithm for
fast and secure data fragmentation. Initial data are fragmented and only
a selected subset of the fragments is encrypted. Further, fragments are
transformed using a variation of an all-or-nothing transform that blends
encrypted and non-encrypted fragments. By encrypting data only par-
tially, we achieve better performance than relevant techniques including
data encryption and straightforward fragmentation. Moreover, when the
ratio between the number of encrypted and non-encrypted fragments is
wisely chosen, data inside fragments are protected against exposure of
the encryption key unless all fragments are gathered by an attacker.
Keywords: Data fragmentation · Data dispersal · Distributed storage ·
Multi-storage · Cloud storage security · Key exposure · lightweight cipher
1 Introduction
Fragmenting and dispersing data over multiple independent storage sites rein-
forces its confidentiality, integrity, and availability [1]. During the past decades,
multiple fragmentation methods were defined and used in various settings [2].
These methods include but are not limited to information-theoretic secret shar-
ing schemes [13], information dispersal algorithms [10], as well as schemes com-
bining symmetric encryption with data fragmentation [8,12].
In modern distributed systems, the most common fragmentation approach is
to form final fragments from large chunks of encrypted data. Data are encrypted,
fragmented in a straightforward manner and then dispersed over different servers
or storage sites. To facilitate key management, encryption keys can also be frag-
mented using a secret sharing scheme and attached to data fragments. To ensure
resilience, data replication or error-correction codes [11] may be applied. This
is a reliable way of proceeding, however it does not protect against powerful
attacker able to recover encryption keys. Indeed, such attackers may obtain a
portion of information by just decrypting fragments in their possession.
Protection against key exposure requires additional post-processing that will
create dependencies between ciphertext blocks contained inside the fragments [7]
or that will shred ciphertext blocks over the fragments [4]. Encrypted data are
then protected against key exposure unless all the fragments are gathered. Such
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additional protection comes at a performance price, as it increases the required
number of operations.
On another hand, partial encryption is usually used in lightweight cipher.
In this paper, we introduce PE-AONT: a fragmentation algorithm that is not
only faster than the most common fragmentation technique, but also (when
wisely applied) protects encrypted data inside fragments against a situaion of key
exposure. To achieve this, PE-AONT fragments initial data into k fragments, but
encrypts only e of them. In a next step, it applies an all-or-nothing transform over
the totality of the fragments that exclusive-ors ciphertext and plaintext blocks.
PE-AONT is then combining AONT technique with partial encryption achieving
speed and a good level of security. A secure dispersal of fragments ensures that
data from a single fragment cannot be recovered unless all fragments are being
gathered. Limiting data encryption allows to speed up the performance, while
the all-or-nothing transform combined with fragmentation ensures good level of
data protection. By adjusting the values of k and e, a user may balance between
the desired performance and data protection level.
Outline In Section 2 we present state-of-the-art techniques for fast data frag-
mentation. In Section 3 we describe in details the proposed PE-AONT algorithm.
In Section 4 we compare PE-AONT with relevant works, analyzing its complex-
ity and level of data protection. Section 5 contains the performance benchmark.
We conclude with an insight into future works.
2 Relevant works
This section presents relevant fragmentation techniques. During descriptions we
will use the following notation. Initial data d are transformed into a set of n
fragments, k of which are needed for data reconstruction. In Bastion scheme, a
sequence of l ciphertext blocks x = X1, . . . , Xl is transformed into a sequence of
l x′ = X ′1, . . . , X
′
l transformed blocks.
2.1 Encryption and Straightforward Fragmentation
A computationally secure scheme for fragmentation of larger data was first in-
troduced by Krawczyk in his seminal work Secret Sharing Made Short (SSMS)
[8]. SSMS can be considered as a more general methodology combining three ele-
ments: data encryption, data fragmentation, and secret sharing of the encryption
key. In the original proposal, data d is encrypted using a symmetric encryption
algorithm, and then fragmented using an information dispersal algorithm into n
fragments, k of which are needed for the data recovery. Encryption key is split
using a perfect secret sharing scheme (typically Shamir’s secret sharing [13]) and
dispersed within data fragments. In contrast to perfect secret sharing schemes
(like the one-time pad or Shamir’s scheme), the storage overhead of SSMS does
not depend on data size, but is equal to the size of the key per data fragment
(for larger data it is practically negligible).
Performance of SSMS depends on implementation details of encryption and
dispersal techniques. In modern implementations, systematic error-correction
codes are used as the dispersal technique [1,11]. This improves the performance,
but allows a partial decryption of compromised fragments in a situation of key
exposure, as the set of fragments contains fragments that are formed from large
encrypted data chunks.
Alike SSMS, the AONT-RS method [3,12] combines symmetric encryption
with data dispersal. The difference between those two methodologies lies in the
key management. In AONT-RS, the key is exclusive-ored with the data hash.
2.2 Bastion scheme
Recently introduced, Bastion [7] transforms a ciphertext in order to make its
decryption computationally infeasible unless all but two ciphertext blocks are
being gathered. In more details, the sequence of l input ciphertext blocks x =
X1, . . . , Xl is multiplied by a square matrix A, such that: (i) all diagonal elements
are set to 0, and (ii) the remaining off-diagonal elements are set to 1 (such matrix
is invertible and A = A−1, so the inverse transform: x = A−1 · x′ = A · x′).
The multiplication x′ = A · x ensures that each output block X ′i will depend
on all output blocks X ′j except from X
′
i,i = j. Bastion achieves much better
performance than other all-or-nothing transforms as it requires only 2l exclusive-
or operations in addition to data encryption.
2.3 Secure Dispersal and Fragmentation
Secure fragmentation and dispersal (SFD) [4] divides a ciphertext encrypted us-
ing a block cipher with a mode of operation that creates chaining between con-
secutive ciphertext blocks (like Cipher Block Chaining) into fragments resisting
to key leakage. The complete scheme is composed of three steps. The first step
separates consecutive blocks of the ciphertext. The second step separates bits
of blocks over final fragments. At last, fragments are dispersed and stored over
independent storage locations e.g. clouds. In consequence, an attacker present
at a single storage location is unabl e to decrypt a single block of the cipher-
text even if she possesses the right encryption key. SFD can be easily integrated
within SSMS or AONT-RS methodologies in order to reinforce their protection
level by providing additional protection against key exposure.
3 Description of the algorithm
PE-AONT is composed of three steps. In a first step, initial data d composed
of m plaintext blocks are fragmented into k fragments, where only e of the k
fragments are encrypted. In a second step, the k fragments are transformed
using an all-or-nothing transform that blends ciphertext contained inside the e
encrypted fragments with the k−e plaintext fragments. Both steps are described
in details in the following subsections.
3.1 Step1: Data fragmentation and partial encryption
Pseudo-code of the first step of the algorithm - FragmentAndEncrypt- is
presented in Figure 1. An example illustrating the process is shown in Figure 2.
During this step, initial data d, composed of m plaintext blocks, is fragmented
into k fragments. Only e < k of the fragments are being encrypted using a block
cipher algorithm. During the encryption process one more block is inserted con-
taining the initial vector. Therefore, at the end of the processing, each fragment
contains #f = lk =
m+1
k (plaintext or ciphertext) blocks.
1: function FragmentAndEncrypt(d, e, k)
2: Fragment data d into k initial fragments f0, . . . , fk−1
3: Encrypt e of the k fragments:
4: for each fragment fi, i = 0, . . . , e− 1 do
5: Encrypt fragment fi
Fig. 1. Pseudo-code of Step 1 fragmenting data into k fragments.
Fig. 2. Step 1, example for k = 4, e = 3, and m = 7. First step of the algorithm
fragments data composed of m blocks into k fragments of size l
k
= 2, where l = m + 1
blocks each. The block C0 is added to d; it corresponds to the ciphertext block containing
the Initial Vector used by the cipher.
3.2 Step 2: All-or-nothing transform of the fragments
The pseudo-code of the second step - AONTTransform - is presented in Fig-
ure 3. An example illustrating the process is presented in Figure 4. Blocks inside
of the k fragments are processed simultaneously, from the block 0 to #f − 1, by
sets of k elements (in a row by row fashion, each block comes from a different
fragment). The all-or-nothing transform presented in [7,14] is applied over the
set of k blocks, e of which are ciphertext blocks and the k − e remaining ones
are plaintext blocks.
1: function AONTransform(f)
2: for i = 0, . . . ,#f − 1 do
3: sum =
⊕j=k−1
0
C#f×j+i
4: for j = 0, . . . , k − 1 do
5: C#f×j+i = C#f×j+i ⊕ sum
Fig. 3. Pseudo-code of the Step 2. An all-or-nothing transform is applied over the k
fragments exclusive-oring their plaintext and ciphertext blocks. #f denotes the number
of blocks inside a fragment. Blocks are processed by ’rows’ of k blocks (each block from a
different fragment). For each ’row’ of k blocks a sum value containing the exclusive-or
of the k blocks is first computed. sum is then exclusive-ored with each value in the row.
Fig. 4. Step2, example for k = 4 and e = 3. Fragments are transformed using an all-
or-nothing transform that exclusive-ors ciphertext and plaintext blocks. The transform
is applied ’row’ by ’row’ over k blocks (each block comes from a different fragment)
protecting the k − e fragments which were not encrypted.
3.3 Step 3: Dispersing fragments
In a final step, fragments are dispersed over independent storage sites. The dis-
persal technique depends on values of e and k.
– For e = k − 1: no more than k − 2 fragments can be stored at a single stor-
age site. This comes from the property of the linear all-or-nothing transform
protecting transformed blocks unless more than k − 2 blocks are exposed [7].
– For e < k − 1: all fragments have to be dispersed over independent storage
sites. As the number of plaintext fragments increases, it is possible that same
combinations of ciphertext blocks will be used to protect different plaintext
blocks. Indeed, data protection level is lower and fragments are only secure
when the assumed attacker is not able to compromise more than one storage
site. It is the price that has to be paid for speeding up the algorithm processing.
4 Theoretical Comparison
We compared PE-AONT with relevant works in terms of amount of computa-
tions and ability to protect against key exposure. Results are shown in Table 1.
As a baseline, we use encryption that requires l − 1 block cipher operations
and l − 1 exclusive-or operations (when applied on a plaintext composed of
m = l − 1 blocks). Bastion scheme applies only a linear transform over the
Table 1. Comparison in terms of number of block cipher operations (block op.), num-
ber of exclusive-ors, and the ability to provide a key exposure protection (K.E.P). We
assume a plaintext of m = l−1 blocks. (*) PE-AONT provides key exposure protection
when e ≥ 3. When e < k − 1 fragments are protected against key exposure, but data is
protected only against an attacker at a single storage site.
Algorithm Block op. Exclusive-ors K.E.P.
Encryption l-1 b.c. l-1 No
Bastion l-1 b.c. 3l-1 [AON Transform: 2l] Yes
SFD l-1 b.c. l-1 Yes
PE-AONT e l
k
b.c. e l
k
+ 2l Yes*
encrypted data without increasing the number of block cipher operations. Bas-
tion’s transform uses 2l exclusive-or operations. Counting with the encryption
step, Bastion scheme requires 3l − 1 exclusive-ors. SFD does not require addi-
tional operations in addition to data encryption, as it just disperses data chunks
over fragments (depending on the programming technique this also leads to a
slight performance overhead of up to 11%). PE-AONT requires only e lk block
cipher operations, as it does not encrypt the totality of the data contained in-
side the fragments. It performs 2l + e lk exclusive-or operations: e
l
k during the
encryption of part of the data and 2l during the AONT.
Encryption and straightforward fragmentation do not protect against key
exposure: an attacker possessing the key is able to decrypt the transformed data.
Bastion protects transformed ciphertext against key exposure unless all but two
blocks are being exposed. The level of data protection in PE-AONT depends
on the values of e and k. To achieve the protection against key exposure, each
plaintext block should be exclusive-ored with at least two different ciphertext
blocks. The minimum value of k is then 4 (as the number of input blocks in the
AONT transform has to be even, see the explanation in: [7]) and the minimum
value of e is 3. Intuitively, the larger the value of e, the higher will be the provided
level of data protection. When e = k − 1, data cannot be decrypted unless all
k fragments are gathered. Fragments are thus protected against key exposure.
When 3 ≥ e ≤ k − 2 the protection is lower and ensured only if the attacker
is at a single storage site. Indeed, when the attacker compromised more than
one site, she can obtain relationships between fragments by exclusive-oring the
fragments in her possession (a similar problem occurs when a one-time pas is
reused). Therefore, the most interesting configuration of PE-AONT is the one
when e = k − 1, as it is not only faster than encryption and straightforward
fragmentation, but also protects data against key exposure.
5 Performance comparison with relevant works
Implementation details Relevant algorithms were implemented using the
same programing style in JAVA with JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-
based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB
RAM, under Windows 7. Standard javax.crypto library was used. A random
data sample was used for each measurement and each presented result is an
average of 30 measurements. AES-NI with 128 bits key was used for encryption.
Performance comparison between relevant algorithms is presented in Fig-
ure 5. The performance of PE-AONT is shown in 4 configurations: two configu-
rations were e = k−1 (and where the protection level is high) and for two config-
urations when e ≤ k−2 (data protection is traded for better performance). In all
configurations, PE-AONT outperforms encryption and straightforward fragmen-
tation. Moreover, it is much faster than two relevant fragmentation techniques
protecting fragmented data against key exposure: SFD and Bastion’s scheme.
Fig. 5. Performance benchmark. PE-AONT was measured in different configurations of
(k, e). In all of them it is faster than encryption and straightforward fragmentation. It
is also faster than two fragmentation schemes protecting against data exposure: secure
fragmentation and dispersal (SFD) and the Bastion scheme.
6 Future works
Our software integrates encryption and PE-AONT in a coarse-grained fashion. In
the future, we would like to integrate the algorithm within the encryption process
to allow an even better fragmentation performance. We recently improved the
Bastion AONT algorithm by decreasing the number of Xor operations needed
to protect data against key exposure in [5] or in [6]. it would be interesting to
analyze and compare in which situation one method is preferable over another
one. PE-AONT is very likely best fitted as a lightweight cipher since it is faster
than the other AONT algorithms. Moreover, we would like to integrate PE-
AONT inside a complete distributed system protecting data using a combination
of fragmentation, encryption, and dispersal [9].
7 Conclusion
PE-AONT: a fast fragmentation method combining partial encryption with an
all-or-nothing transform was introduced in order to speed up the fragmentation
performance. The desired performance and protection levels can be adjusted by
the user who can set parameter values to increase performance and decrease
protection or the other way around. An experimental evaluation shows that
the algorithm achieves better performance than relevant techniques including
the most common way of data fragmentation. As such, it can be chosen as a
lightweight cipher. Moreover, by carefully choosing parameters values, it protects
fragmented data against a situation of key exposure as long as an attacker does
not access to the entire set of fragments. We now believe that PE-AONT could
be considered as a software component and successfully be integrated within
modern distributed systems where rapid protection is required.
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